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Introduction 
One of the main themes running through the work of Norman Long is the 
differential ways in which policy statements and directions are being re-
interpreted and transformed at the various levels of organisation and interaction 
on their way to 'the local people'. Much of his and his students' work (often 
illustrated with wonderfully detailed case studies), has been devoted to showing 
how local actors, in their own interaction or in interaction with development 
agents, have appropriated external policy messages and the resources that often 
accompany them. In this way, these actors have created or expanded their 'room 
to manoeuvre' and have thus been able to transform policy programmes and 
projects themselves.1 The central issue concerns the question of how to 
conceptualise and analyse the ways in which the state operates and affects 
people's lives. 
Norman Long has been exceptionally sensitive to the problem of avoiding 
simple dichotomies between state and civil society. His work on what he initially 
called the interface over time developed into a sophisticated analysis of the 
complex contexts in which what is conveniently summarised as 'the state' affects 
peoples lives, be they part of the state or not. It could also be characterised as an 
attempt to come to grips with what is known as the 'actor-structure' problematic, 
an attempt that combines micro and macro levels, devoting particular attention to 
variation in time and space. His interests have been largely similar to our own 
concerns, though clearly the emphasis is slightly different. What binds Norman 
Long and us perhaps the most is a strong focus on the historical dimensions of 
the issues we are interested in: issues such as the development of a time-oriented 
legal anthropology that combines a long-term historical perspective with the 
perspective of individually centred, short-term, choice making instrumental 
action and interaction (Moore, 1978: 256; F. von Benda-Beckmann, 1979: 6). 
One way of looking at institutionalisation is by studying how, why and to what 
extent actors are involved in trying to 'bind the future' (Stinchcombe, 1997) 
through their actions, deliberations and struggles. History is treated not so much 
as a focus on the past, but as a dimension for understanding the present and as a 
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way for looking into the future. Legal rules and normative frameworks are 
viewed as condensed ways of binding the future. Treating law as one of the most 
important means and products of institutionalisation is particularly interesting, 
because law creates potentialities or opportunity sets, as Sen (1978) would call 
them. This paper, then, is an exercise in social science as characterised by Tilly 
(1997: 17) 'Social science is the systematic study of what could happen, what 
could have happened, what will possibly happen, in human social life, and why''. 
In this paper we shall focus on ongoing processes in which a multitude of 
actors in different arenas (Long, 1997: 6) of rule and decision are making 
attempts to institute new legal structures for local government in order to come 
to a new balance between state regulation and other forms of political legitimacy 
and economic rights. The historical setting for this is the current process of 
decentralisation in Indonesia, which was set in motion after the demise of the 
Suharto regime in 1998.2 The greater political freedom that came with the fall of 
the Suharto regime and the decentralisation policy adopted in 1999 in many parts 
of Indonesia have led to a re-assessment of local, ethnically informed legal 
orders. In Indonesia, these legal orders are generally referred to as adat (adat 
laws and forms of adat based social organisation), and the new decentralisation 
policy has initiated a re-appraisal of adat by local people, local and regional 
government agencies, and national and international non-governmental agencies. 
As is often the case in periods of high political turmoil, the decentralisation 
policy has also triggered a re-assessment of local history, and in particular, forms 
of political organisation and economic rights based on adat. It has also initiated 
an acute concern of how and to what extent this history is to become relevant for 
the future. The Province of West Sumatra is of particular relevance because the 
process of decentralisation has been taken up to renegotiate the structure of local 
government in order to 'actualise' (Giordano, 1996) earlier historical forms of 
local government and to change the relative significance of adat officials and 
rules. 
We shall consider two aspects of these processes. One is the change within 
local government organisation, the newly emerging and partially established 
forms of legitimacy of political representation and decision making powers, and 
the role which elements of adat are given in these new forms. The other is the 
revitalisation of adat as the basis for economic claims to natural resources on the 
village territory. Many of these resources had earlier been appropriated and 
exploited by the state under legislation. Some had also been exploited by para-
statal enterprises or 'privatised' through licences and concessions to national or 
transnational enterprises, which were usually closely connected with the inner 
circle of the Suharto clan. These processes are still in full swing. There are 
serious forces that would like to weaken and change decentralisation, leaving 
greater powers to the central government and the provinces. The most recent 
change, the demotion of President Wahid and the installation of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri äs President may have far reaching consequences since Megawati 
is said to be much less attracted by decentralisation and to favour a strong central 
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State. She may also occupy a different position than her predecessors, Habibie 
and Wahid, towards the external pressure applied by donors. While there is still 
strong and unrelenting pressure for more regional autonomy from within the 
country, especially from the economically strong regions, the stage seems to be 
changing internationally. Development analysts seem to have lost some of their 
earlier enthusiasm for decentralisation in the light of the problematic evidence 
brought forward to date, and there have been voices calling for more restraint. It 
is very difficult to predict what the situation will be a year from now. Our 
findings are therefore very preliminary, all the more so because we are in the 
middle of a new research project on these issues ourselves (Benda-Beckmann, F. 
andK. von, 2001). 
Decentralisation in West Sumatra: the general context 
Indonesia has entered a dramatic political process since the fall of the Suharto 
regime. A wider range of political freedoms characterises it, with a completely 
new role for parliamentary politics. This, however, has also been accompanied 
by high political instability. In many of the outer islands, independence 
movements, civil and religious wars, and sometimes violent forms of ethnic 
cleansing are taking place. To redress political problems, the government 
initiated a process of decentralisation, which was officially inaugurated by the 
Decentralisation Laws of 1999. This process was the outcome of both internal 
and regional pressures aimed at rendering greater economic and political 
independence from the formerly strong political centre. Important donors such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and others have also applied pressure in the hope that 
decentralisation will enable a more democratic and economically responsible 
policy to be pursued. In fear of encouraging secessionist developments, the new 
decentralisation law did not opt for the provinces as the most important 
autonomous regions, but for the regencies (kabupaten). 
In West Sumatra, decentralisation also brings an important change in the 
organisation of village government. Until the early 1980s, village government in 
Minangkabau region of West Sumatra had been based on the nagari, the name 
for the traditional, pre-colonial political units often referred to as village 
republics. These had largely been incorporated into the Dutch administrative 
system as the lowest form of indirect rule. During their rule, the Dutch 
government repeatedly intervened and changed the traditional political 
organisation of the nagari, a process that continued after Independence. When 
we were doing our research in West Sumatra in the 1970s, many nagari had a 
dualistic political organisation. One official hierarchy incorporated into the local 
government organisation of the state consisted of the Village Mayor and the 
Village Council,3 in which traditional adat elders always played an important 
role. The other was the adat organisation in which leadership was legitimated in 
Minangkabau adat only. However, this adat was not an 'authentic', 
This Village Council, which was composed of adapt leaders, religious leaders and intellectuals 
should be distinguished from the Village Adat Council, whose members are adat leaders only. The 
terminology is, however, not always consistent. 
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'uncontaminated' set of norms and institutions. It was deeply affected by the 
colonial experience and has continued to be affected by the wider national setting 
in which it has operated during the last 50 years of Independence (see K. von 
Benda-Beckmann, 1984). 
When Indonesia attempted to homogenise the plurality of laws on its territory 
and to consolidate centralist rule in the 1970s, the then existing regional 
variations in local government were also standardised. The Javanese model of 
the village (desa) as the lowest local government unit became the standard model 
throughout Indonesia. In Minangkabau, this meant that the nagari were split into 
several desa. However, a provincial regulation of 19834 allowed the nagari to 
become the 'adat law community' (masyarakat hukum adat) and the Village 
Adat Council to become the institution representing this community. A number 
of implementing regulations gave detailed instructions of how the Village Adat 
Council was to be constituted according to adat and on how it was to exercise its 
main tasks i.e. strengthening traditional values, maintaining the unity of the 
nagari population, managing its riches and settling disputes on adat matters. A 
circular letter of the West Sumatran Appeal Court made it clear that adat 
disputes would not be accepted unless the Village Adat Council had decided 
them upon. The nagari as adat law community and the Village Adat Council 
thus, paradoxically, were formally regulated as 'informal law and institution'. 
With decentralisation or 'regional autonomy' coming into view, discussions on 
what this could mean for Minangkabau erupted in the provincial and regional 
political arenas, among engaged citizens and in the villages. Many local 
politicians and traditional village leaders claimed that local government should 
'return to the nagari". It was generally held that the desa system had not 
functioned well, that it destroyed adat and the unity of the nagari population, 
and eroded the authority of elders. Optimists hoped, somewhat naively, that 
going back to the nagari would solve these problems. More sceptical voices, 
among them many urban intellectuals and the acting desa heads, pointed out that 
a return to some nostalgic past would not remedy these evils. In their eyes, the 
unsatisfactory functioning of the desa was primarily due to the inadequate 
financial and personal resources provided to the desa administration, and to the 
fact that adat leaders did not co-operate with the desa administration. Moreover, 
if anyone had destroyed adat and adat authority, it was the adat leaders 
themselves who no longer really knew adat, had failed to develop the Village 
Adat Council into a functioning institution and had manipulated whatever control 
they had over nagari assets for their own personal advantage. Similar reproaches 
were also heard from many favouring adat and the return to the nagari, although 
in their view, the problems were the consequence of the desa system itself and 
that the situation would improve once village government was returned to the 
nagari. Others maintained that the expected changes would be minimal and that 
reform would be confined to simply changing the name of the local government 
unit. Those who were still vehemently opposed a year ago, had changed their 
position in March 2001, and not only because the political decisions had been 
made. By spring 2001, it had become generally accepted that West Sumatra was 
to revert to a nagari structure. The provincial regulation No. 9 of 2000, which 
' Perda (Peraturan Daerah) Regional Regulation 13 of 1983. 
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provided the framework for going back to the nagari, constitutes a point of no 
return in the eyes of most people. Now the debate is focused on what type of 
nagari should be reverted to (if at all) and to what extent and how general 
principles of democracy could be included into the new structure. 
The provincial arena 
Prior to the general elections in 1999, the 'back to the nagari' policy had been 
officially adopted by the governor and the West Sumatran provincial parliament. 
There were a number of critics in parliament, some because of their strong 
alliance to the centralist Suharto regime, others out of a deep concern for 
democratic structures. The decision-making arena reached beyond its members 
and the political parties. The influential provincial organisation of adat leaders, 
Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (LKAAM), was a strong player as 
its most important members were former high officials in the provincial and 
regional administration. Some of these were members who had returned to a 
position in the regency after regional elections and some were academics who 
were also adat leaders in their own villages. Though the LKAAM claimed to be 
an organisation totally outside of the state structure, this is not how others 
perceived them. The establishment of the LKAAM had been supported by the 
government to contain political adat aspirations, and the organisation had been 
deeply involved in the state administration throughout the Suharto regime. 
Nevertheless, the LKAAM's position has become increasingly independent from 
the provincial government, advocating the most far-reaching form of a return to 
the adat structure of the nagari. They want to place control over village 
resources exclusively with the council of adat leaders, and are critical of those 
seeking a too easy compromise between adat principles and administrative 
structures of a democratic organisation. In addition to this, there are a number of 
influential consultants to the governor within Andalas University. The governor 
had committed himself to a return to the nagari before parliament had taken a 
decision. A research team, headed by a long time consultant from Andalas 
University and a strong protagonist of a return to the nagari structure, was sent 
out to poll the views of the village populations. The poll concluded that a large 
majority favoured a return to the nagari? In contrast to the LKAAM, a number 
of these consultants showed considerable sensitivity towards the contradictory 
demands of adat and modern democracy. The findings of the team were a 
persuasive factor in the political decision but may not have tipped the balance 
without the disenchantment that existed towards the national political situation of 
the reformasi, something that reinforced the general tendency towards 
regionalism. Adat is a powerful resource for mobilizing and legitimising 
opposition to the Javanese political centre of the nation state. A return to the 
nagari structure is thus a symbolic act within the wider national political debate. 
This revitalisation of adat is not confined to West Sumatra. With the help of 
NGOs, an All Indonesian Adat Alliance has been formed that claims greater 
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legal recognition of adat and adat based rights to natural resources (see Acciaoli, 
2000). Minangkabau seems to be taking the lead and other regions look with 
interest at the developments taking place there. 
However, the most important political controversies were not yet resolved by 
the general decision to return to the nagari. Three major issues had to be 
debated: 
• The territorial boundaries (including the possibility to separate away from a 
nagari) 
• The composition and competence of village institutions, including the 
control over project funds from higher levels of the state administration 
• Control over village resources. 
After extensive discussions concerning approximately twenty draft regulations 
within and outside the provincial parliament, and consultations between non-
governmental adat, Islamic organisations and influential Minangkabau migrants 
in Jakarta, the province enacted a provincial regulation6 which became effective 
in January 2001. This regulation contained the framework for 'going back to the 
nagari'' and a general framework for new local government was established. The 
language of the regulation is full of references to adat. The preamble states that 
West Sumatra goes back to nagari government, followed by the ritual formula 
that it is based on 'adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah. Syarak 
mangato adat memakai alam tabangjadi guru'. (Adat is based on Islam, Islam is 
based on the holy Koran; religious law orders, adat is used; nature is the teacher 
of mankind). The regulation provides for an initial return to the pre-1979 nagari 
territorial boundaries (par.2). Furthermore, it mentions the nagari resources: a 
market, village field, council hall, mosque and prayer houses, land, forest, rivers, 
ponds, lakes and part of the sea which used to be common nagari resources 
(ulayat nagari), public buildings and movables and other properties (par. 7). This 
is indeed in line with classical adat. The village government consists of an 
elected mayor, an elected legislative body, and an advisory body consisting of 
representatives of four or more of categories, i.e. adat leaders, religious leaders, 
intellectuals and women. The adat council, consisting of adat leaders, is 
regulated in the Provincial regulation but does not form part of the official 
village government. This council is to mediate in disputes relating to family 
property and to protect adat in general. This structure resembles in many 
respects the mixture of adat and state principles that have characterised local 
government in West Sumatra since the late colonial period. 
The regulation leaves the most important issues open. The crucial question as 
to how these resources are to be managed and by whom is a different matter. 
This is left to a separate provincial regulation, while more detailed regulations as 
to the precise form of the village institutions are to be made by regencies. So far, 
the Regulations of the Minister of the Interior and of Agrarian Affairs7 states that 
the newly recognised rights cannot be exercised on land, which has been 
declared by the regional government as belonging to private individuals or legal 
entities holding a right under the Agrarian Basic Law. They also do not apply to 
land that has been 'freed' or otherwise obtained by governmental agencies, legal 
6Perda9of2000. 
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entities, individuals in accordance with governmental regulations. As we shall 
see below, this has not prevented land claims from being successful. 
Regency arenas 
The new regency heads and parliaments have (re)acted with marked variations in 
speed and enthusiasm to these developments. In two districts, 50 Koto and 
Solok, energetic regents, one of whom was a leading member of the LKAAM, 
have taken a number of initiatives to implement the new structure as soon as 
possible, revising their regency administrative structure and pushing forward the 
return to the nagari system. They were quick in promulgation of their own 
Regency Regulations and were ready to start at the moment the provincial 
regulation became effective. They have taken this new, more autonomous 
position seriously. This means more control over their resources, but less funding 
from the central government. Both call for a far more intensive occupation with 
development potentials within their region. In line with the greater autonomy of 
villages, they have initiated collaborative economic activities with local 
governments. The same regents also promote the installation of new adat 
leaders, but not so out of a concern with adat itself. They argue instead that since 
the new structure of local government allows for a stronger and more substantial 
role for adat leaders, there is a need for well-educated adat leaders who 
understand the way the modern economy works. These regents also use the new 
legal structure to create links that would have been unthinkable under the 
hierarchical legal structures of old regime. During Suharto's New Order the only 
important links were hierarchical, if possible directly with the central 
government, from which all funding came and which had the final decision in 
all-important economic matters. Regents all over Indonesia have now started to 
organise themselves horizontally, in order to create a political platform strong 
enough to oppose those who want to revert to the old hierarchical structures. 
Moreover, they realise that they have new economic problems in common and 
hope to learn from the experiences of other regencies. Thus a new arena of 
debate and decision making is emerging that was not foreseen, let alone 
intended. It has resulted instead from the new potentialities created by a new 
legal framework. 
Not all regents are as energetic. Many have remained relatively passive, 
waiting to see what other regents and higher political authorities are going to do. 
There is still much criticism of the new structure. What is perceived as a 
challenge for some regents is a reason for profound anxiety for others, especially 
about the economic future. Those who had always depended on a continuous 
flow of funding from the various departments at the central level, and who had 
successfully siphoned off parts of these funds, look with alarm to the drying up 
of central government funding. Moreover, those who had arranged themselves 
successfully in the centralist clientilist system and had carved out a private forest 
business backed by licences from the centre, now face strong controversy and 
Some of the line departments, such as the Department of Social Affairs, have been dismantled. As 
these departments were the most important sources for funding, there is much confusion as to how 
the funding will be organised in the future. Generally substantial cuts are expected as part of the IMF 
policy to reduce state expenditures. 
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Opposition from local communities who are already claiming back control over 
forest resources. Decentralisation thus has created substantial insecurity for those 
who occupy the new power positions. However, it would be wrong to conclude 
that reluctance grows out of private interest only. Some regents are genuinely 
concerned about a too powerful role for adat leaders. They have seen too many 
adat leaders who took private advantage of their position, who are poorly 
educated and know little of adat. They have no confidence in the capacities of 
these adat leaders and think that more autonomy can only harm economic 
development. These hope that by sitting it out, they will be able to survive until a 
more centralist policy comes into place. 
Nagari arenas 
The lowest arena in which these issues are being negotiated is the nagari. Here, 
too, the response to the new regulations and political debates is quite diverse, 
both in terms of pace and content. Some nagari-to-be have been quick in 
establishing the new nagari governmental structure and began designing 
regulations even before the regency regulations had been enacted. Others have 
remained passive, waiting for orders from higher up. The desa heads established 
an organisation, Forum Komunikasi Kepala Desa, which vehemently opposed 
the return to the nagari originally. They have, however, come to accept the 
decision that there will be a nagari structure, though they continue to point out 
that there are many controversial issues and the move back to the nagari is not in 
line with the aspirations of the people (Padang Ekspres 28 May, 2001). Draft 
regency regulations are being discussed, criticised and amended, and in the more 
advanced regencies the first new-style nagari with their new leaders are being 
formally installed. Debates are at times hot and nasty. The arena is, in the first 
place, constituted by the inhabitants of the nagari. Also, migrants from the 
village living in the regional or provincial capital or even in one of the large 
cities outside of West Sumatra often take a keen interest in the issues and 
participate in the debates, by phone, fax, e-mail and if necessary in person. It is 
in this arena that the composition and competence of each of the village 
institutions will reach its final form. 
During the New Order, when hardly any decisions of political or economic 
consequence were left to the village government, having a position in the village 
government provided the possibility to gain access to project money. This time it 
may involve much more. In addition to control over funding flows, there is the 
issue of who will control village resources. Since the expectation is that less 
money will come from above, with more remaining within the village in the form 
of land, forest and market taxes, much (potential) economic and political power 
is at stake. Many, however, may have an unrealistic view of how high such 
revenues will be. 
The re-construction of history is most actively pursued in the debates about the 
division of power positions. Adat leaders and their followers argue that originally 
(i.e. before the colonial period), they constituted the village government. As 
guardians of the village and family histories, they claim legitimacy as being 
responsible for the control the village resources. The desa-heads respond to these 
claims by arguing that adat leaders have long ceased to be interested in adat, that 
they don't know anything about adat anymore, and are in general a reactionary, 
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backward bunch of people who have been known to cheat their relatives. They 
go on to claim that the desa-heads, on the other hand, have proven to be much 
closer to the ordinary village people during the past years and therefore should 
keep their position. Derisory remarks by Adat leaders and supporters counter this 
by arguing that the only thing desa heads are interested in is keeping their 
motorbikes and other material goods acquired through their office. Issues such as 
these are prominently discussed in the newspapers. 
The procedure for selecting the members of the village parliament is an 
important issue in nagari politics. Some are of the opinion that the new village 
parliament as highest authority should be a democratically elected body and not 
(in their view) an autocratic adat council. This is vehemently denied by the adat 
lobby, who claim to be the guardians of the true, Minangkabau type of 
democracy based on a consensual model, far superior to the 'western style 50+1 
voting democracy'. The debate is interesting, because it revolves around 
different opinions of what constitutes democracy. Others have different 
interpretations of adat and opt for a structure in which the four or five basic 
categories are represented: adat leaders, religious leaders, intellectuals (people 
with a reasonable education and with a good position in business or otherwise), 
women and youth. General elections and party politics are associated with the 
Suharto regime and therefore widely rejected. According to this view, balanced 
representation can only be reached by means of adat, understood in this sense. 
Labelling this as adat is a powerful political act, for in public discourse, adat is 
'below' and development from below means development based on adat, not on 
individual people. As far as we know, most nagari that have had general 
meetings over the composition of the village parliament have opted for the 
selection of members from such categories, whereby adat members are to be 
selected by consensus within adat clan units, and others at the level of the former 
desa. Donor agencies who are supporting the formation of new village 
governments, such as the German Agency for Development Co-operation 
{Deutsche Gesellschaftför Technische Zusammenarbeit-GTZ), uncritically adopt 
these principles. There is a remarkable and widely shared lack of historical 
understanding. The same categories that are employed now figured in the various 
bodies of village government throughout the Suharto era, an era that is now 
generally interpreted as having been utterly undemocratic. What is more, the 
Golkar was originally established not as a political party, but as a body of 
representatives of 'functional groups'. The irony is that what is meant as a 
rejection of the undemocratic New Order of Suharto, is taking over precisely the 
principles upon which its main political support was founded. 
Splitting nagari 
Generally, the majority of people currently accept the policy of returning to the 
nagari as the local government organisation. In some former nagari however, 
some desa do not want to re-unite but wish to establish their own nagari instead. 
Here, the strong emphasis on adat, the historical roots of the nagari and adat 
leaders and the adat council also becomes important. Minangkabau villages 
The GTZ in three nagari has sponsored and supported the meetings through which the Regency 
Regulation and the ways of selecting members of the village parliament were concretised. 
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often make a clear distinction between original settlers and newcomers, and this 
distinction has political and economic relevance in adat. Newcomers may be 
very recent settlers, such as traders, but they may also have lived there for over 
one hundred years and still don't have a status of full citizen in the adat sense (F. 
von Benda-Beckmann, 1979). Most of these settler groups are Minangkabau 
themselves, descendants from former slaves or traders, but there are also some 
Javanese trans-migrant and spontaneous settler communities as well. Some of 
these groups live in a more or less separate section of the old nagari, forming a 
desa of their own in the present structure. Such groups very much fear losing 
their independence with the reversion to the nagari structure and hope to 
establish their own nagari. The territory on which these communities live is 
usually part of the inherited property of certain clans or village property. 
Consequently, this is a source of much consternation for adat leaders who fear a 
loss of control over village and family property if trans-migrant communities and 
spontaneous settler groups succeed in establishing their own nagari. During the 
drafting of the provincial regulation an intensive lobby was launched, fiercely 
opposed by the adat lobby, to convince the governor that it should be possible to 
return to a nagari structure but to split the old territory right at the initiation of 
the new regulation. In this way, the new regulation could be used to get rid of the 
claims by original communities and their adat leaders who continued to insist 
that newcomers submit to such claims. The governor, who was aware of the 
political dynamite of this issue, decided that there was to be a return to the 
nagari boundaries of before 1979 first, and that negotiating a split-up would 
become a second step in the process. This was a great disappointment for those 
who had hoped to be freed from the dominating elite in the name of adat. No 
doubt it will be more difficult to negotiate a division of the nagari, if it happens 
at all. The new interest in village resources as a result of decentralisation, and as 
a result of the interest of migrant community members, has rendered adat leaders 
more reluctant to relinquish village control over their territories. However, desa 
who are pushing their claim towards independence in nagari in pursuit of a 
speedy recognition have a means to force the other desa and adat leaders into 
some compromises concerning their future position. They are placing their bets 
on reluctance from the regent to recognise a nagari facing internal difficulties. 
Not all adat leaders are opposed to such a split, but most would agree that a split 
could only be done under their guidance and with their consent. And this is 
precisely what these communities had hoped to avoid. 
Actualising and reconstructing history 
These processes have therefore elicited a renewed keen interest in village history 
and its reconstruction, but also of the history of individual clans and families. It 
has become very important to know the history of settlement of a nagari, the 
history of clan and lineage cleavages and the history of inheritance, because this 
knowledge is decisive for the procedure and pace of nagari foundation and 
potential division. The interest in history is also spawned by land claims. The 
demise of the Suharto regime and the ensuing new political freedom has been 
used up to claim back land and forest that was appropriated by the government. 
Fear of repression had previously kept the local population from complaining but 
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constraint is no longer necessary. As a result, numerous claims have been filed in 
court or lobbied for in political negotiations. The most controversial claims 
regard village property {tanah ulayaf) that had first been placed under state 
control by the so-called Domeindeclaraties, in West Sumatra enacted in 1874. 
While the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 recognised the ulayat rights of local 
communities in an ambiguous way, state legal and administrative practices did 
not really take these rights seriously. These acts have been contested throughout 
history, because village governments claimed entitlement on the basis of adat. 
Under the Dutch regime, but more so under the New Order, much land was taken 
away by the government and handed out in semi-public or private hands, usually 
to those close to the regime. Some land was simply taken without compensation, 
but handsome amounts of money are also known to have been given in exchange 
for other land. Moreover, some land undoubtedly had the status of village ulayat, 
but clan ulayat has also been appropriated. Thus it is not always clear who the 
legitimate claimants are: the village government, the adat council, the head of 
one particular clan, all lineage heads within the clan, or even one particular 
lineage and its head? And although many of the claims that the land was taken 
by force or coercion are probably correct, the chaos of the situation provides 
ample opportunity for energetic lineage heads to claim land that was transferred 
without coercion and properly compensated for or to claim land that did not 
belong to their lineage in the first place. The newspapers, for example, are full of 
reports of open conflicts and negotiations about forest areas, plantations, water 
resources and the land and materials used by a certain cement factory in Padang. 
The first successes have been booked. Some land has been placed back under 
village control and some clans have successfully reclaimed their land. 
These successes also demonstrate how important the division of competence 
among the new bodies of village government is. More generally, there is a great 
urge to move forward and score successes. It is important to place one's claims 
on the various tables, be it a proposal for a village government structure or the 
claim for the paramount position in village government, the claim to split-off as 
an independent nagari, land and forest claims, etc. Moving forward quickly and 
energetically provides village leaders with the opportunity to shape the future 
village organisation according to their values and interests. It also means that 
funding flows will start flowing early. Speedy regulation and speedy land claims 
are both important devices to bind the future. They serve to establish a reputation 
of successful management in the village, which will be a strong legitimising 
factor in a situation that is subject to so many diverse interpretations. It could 
well be that these types of activities today have the same function as successful 
mediation in disputes among villagers or being present at important occasions 
such as land transactions (see K. von Benda-Beckmann, 1984). As in former 
times, village history and village adat have to be restated and re-invented. But 
the arena in which this is done is not only the village setting as such. It also 
includes negotiations with higher levels of state government, notably the regency 
and the province. 
No reliable documents are available for most of these contested transfers. 
What remains is the oral history of village, clan and lineage. And it is in 
connection with these issues that the recreation of history is most acute. The 
problem with this oral history is that recent decades have been marked by a 
dramatic decline in interest in the function of the adat leader. Yet the adat 
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system was built on the legitimate knowledge of adat leaders who were required 
to hand down this official knowledge to their successors. Modern education and 
the oppressive regime have placed little value on adat and have made the 
position of adat leader unattractive. Certainly, it had become fashionable for 
high state officials in the armed and civil service in Jakarta to show off with an 
adat title, but this was mere folklore and was not paired with any knowledge of 
adat matters. Thus there has been a serious rupture in the chain of oral history. 
Today the office of adat leader has become attractive once more. Offices that 
had been vacant everywhere for many years are being filled again. Often, well-
educated and well-connected men who live in the regional or provincial capital 
are installed. They are close enough to their village to be able to come when 
there is a problem, while being expected to mobilise their connections with the 
region and province when required from their position in the cities. But these 
men also have little or no knowledge of adat matters. Knowledge of 
Minangkabau adat as a cultural and legal system, with its innumerable adat 
sayings, rules and maxims, is increasingly available from books written by adat 
experts. However, adat knowledge in the sense of village, clan, lineage and 
property history is only orally transmitted. For this, urban adat officials have 
largely to rely on their elderly, often female, relatives. It is this knowledge in 
particular that is required to assert, and manipulate, claims to political position 
and economic rights under the adat constitution. 
Conclusions 
Decentralisation in West Sumatra is therefore a dynamic and complex process. A 
multitude of actors move in and across several and often overlapping 'semi-
autonomous social fields' (Moore, 1973), putting forward and negotiating their 
claims and proposals for instituting the structures for new local governance and 
resource rights. As far as 'going back to the nagarï is concerned, regents, 
parliamentarians, village leaders and ordinary villagers alike actualise history by 
intentionally 'mobilising' an earlier form of local government organisation into 
the present as structure for the future (Giordano, 1996). Once actualised, the past 
itself offers several different repertoires of nagari structure for concretising the 
future meaning of the past, or rather one of the pasts. When it comes to a more 
concrete normative interpretation of, for instance, whose positions in adat will be 
politically relevant in the new system or who has what claims to natural 
resources, then the history of the village, clan, lineage and village property is 
also reconstructed to fit the actor's political and economic ambitions. 
The interfaces in which different (and opposed) actors present relatively 
homogenous views of how the political and economic village constitutions 
should be are not clear-cut. Most of the models proposed form a complex 
mixture of direct state regulation and adat elements within state regulation. 
Reconstructions of 'pure traditional adaf resort mainly to clarifying the nature 
and function of the adat elements within the complex new structures. The most 
radical mobilisation of adat that largely denies the political superiority of state 
rights can be found in claims asserting the fundamental village rights to village 
ulayat land: claims from which state legislation can only derive lesser rights. 
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Most actors are also 'Janus-faced' (F. von Benda-Beckmann et. al, 1989). 
They hold positions in varying relations of power and legitimisation. This goes 
for many adat leaders prominently involved in these discussions; they are adat 
leaders but also university lecturers or government officials or businessmen. 
They view the new structure from a variety of interests, trying to find structures 
sympathetic to their interests. The common village population is less involved, 
more passive and more frustrated about these processes. Not unjustifiably, they 
feel that most of the deliberation and decision making processes occur over their 
heads, and they have cynical views about the political rhetoric which is so 
strongly emphasising adat values and the 'bottom-up' character of the political 
process. 
The different social processes that constitute the 'decentralisation', which take 
place in small-scale locales, have their own preliminary outcomes, that form the 
contexts for new social processes, are highly interdependent. Many actors move 
through and participate in different arenas. There is an intense interest in 
knowing what has been said or decided in other arenas, and information is sought 
and distributed at a high pace. This is facilitated by the widespread networks of 
which the main actors are a part of and by forms of communication such as 
mobile phones. The local newspapers (increased from two to seven in the past 
three years) are an important medium and constitute an arena themselves. Each 
day the papers are full of reports about meetings of adat elders with regency 
officials, the state of claims against plantation enterprises, the discussions of 
draft regency legislation in nagari A and B, the official recognition of the first 
nagari and the election of nagari heads etc. Prominent adat leaders, university 
professors and journalists regularly give their interpretation of the pros and cons 
for going back to the nagari and the conflicts over resource rights, adapting their 
ideas to the most recent state of affairs. 
It is difficult, however, to obtain a good grasp on all deliberations, 
conclusions, and draft regulations being simultaneously debated in the 
innumerable meetings in the different arenas throughout Minangkabau. Clearly, 
a good overall picture at any given moment of what is summarised as 'the 
decentralisation process' would require a continuous aggregation of micro 
events, as demanded by Collins (see Collins, 1992). But even if such aggregation 
contained, for each micro situation, analyses of how macro-structures and 
representations (Knorr-Cetina, 1988) through interactions become involved and 
reproduced in these small-scale settings, it would not allow us to come to a full 
understanding of the effects of such interactions or for what might happen in 
later and different contexts. We would still have to 'trace the ripple effects', the 
intended and unintended consequences of such interactions for more distant 
arenas in time and space (Long, 1989: 230). Our research is at a stage in which 
hundreds of people each day throw a handful of pebbles into the water of 
decentralisation. We hope to be able to trace some of the ripples after the high 
waves of political turmoil have subdued. 
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